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History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come
in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too
extravagant to endure.
- Justice Thurgood Marshall'
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, each time a severe national security threat was
recognized by the United States, the legal system was called upon to
answer one important question: To what extent may a democratic society
violate the very rights it was founded upon in order to ensure the survival
of that society? In answering this question, the government and the
courts have applied various tests that should theoretically standardize this
evaluation and effectively preserve some minimum level of personal
rights while maintaining the necessary protections for society as a whole.
Five examples from the history of this balancing act stand out. In
the American Civil War, it was the executive, not the judiciary, which
established the tests, resulting in little regard given to individual rights
and in widespread constitutional violations. In both the Japanese-Ameri-
can internment cases and the McCarthy era, there were even greater vio-
lations. Here the courts mandated the constitutional tests. These tests,
however, did little more than legally justify any action the government
thought necessary. The anti-terrorism efforts of the 1990s and 2000s, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)2 and the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act),3 extended
such constitutional violations into the sphere of electronic surveillance.
Additionally, the acts themselves provided their own constitutional tests
based upon the earlier framework created by the courts. The egregious
civil liberty violations in these examples prove the inability of previous
constitutional tests to curb those violations and the necessity of a more
effective test that still allows the government the necessary tools to pro-
tect the United States from external enemies.
This note not only examines the historical issues that present them-
selves in this context but also looks at new complexities found in the
I Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
2 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801-63 (2000)). For further discussion, see
discussion infra Part I.D.
3 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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information age and terrorism's unique challenge of asymmetrical war-
fare. 4 By taking an in-depth look at the infringement of civil liberties
during these historical moments of grave national security concerns and
analyzing the USA PATRIOT Act's "electronic information" effects, this
note hopes to develop a framework in which to address both civil liberty
and security concerns in the modern information age. In doing so, this
note proposes a "one step lower" test that could be applied to current and
future security scenarios.
This note will therefore examine (1) the history of civil rights in
times of threats to the security of the country, culminating in the USA
PATRIOT Act, (2) specific civil rights concerns within the electronic
information spheres of the USA PATRIOT Act, and (3) a proposed new
constitutional test that would more effectively balance the interests of
individual rights and national security. The application of the "one step
lower" test will provide the courts with a flexible standard to safely bal-
ance personal rights with the need to defend the United States for the
limited duration of a national security crisis.
I. CIVIL RIGHTS INFRINGEMENTS FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY REASONS
The history of infringements upon civil rights in times of crises in
national security provides a useful insight into the evolution of these in-
fringements and a backdrop upon which the USA PATRIOT Act can be
evaluated. In Fact, an examination of problems in the USA PATRIOT
Act without understanding the historical context of civil rights violations
in the United States would provide an unrealistic assessment of the
problems at hand and would prove of little use in attempting to prepare
for future crises. In order to properly evaluate the context of the personal
rights dilemma, we will briefly examine a number of representative ex-
amples, including the American Civil War, the internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War II, McCarthyism during the Cold War,
FISA, the antiterrorism legislation of the 1990s, and the events leading to
the adoption of the USA PATRIOT Act. Additionally, this section in-
cludes a primer on electronic surveillance in the United States.
4 Asymmetrical warfare is warfare between two opponents who use different combat
techniques. Guerrilla warfare, in which one side fights using traditional tactics and the other
uses hit-and-run tactics with little regard for the conventions of warfare, is an example of
asymmetrical warfare. See IAN 0. LESSER ET AL., COUNTERING THE NEW TERRORISM, 94-96
(1999).
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A. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 5
While certainly not the first civil rights intrusion in the name of
national security, 6 the American Civil War provides perhaps the most
egregious early infraction of those rights. At the outbreak of the Civil
War, President Abraham Lincoln declared a state of national emergency
and suspended all rights in certain key border states. 7 In addition to us-
ing federal troops to intimidate state legislators and influence their deci-
sions, 8 Lincoln imprisoned 13,000 civilians and suspended the writ of
habeas corpus so that no inquiry could be made into the validity of their
detainment. 9 Included in this number were civilians arrested for "dis-
couraging volunteer enlistments."' 0 Lincoln had federal troops occupy,
by force, large portions of the Maryland countryside, arrested a mayor
and nineteen members of the Maryland state legislature, and refused to
honor a writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Taney for a promi-
nent Baltimore citizen who had been "arrested by the military on a
charge of aiding the enemy."' "I In Missouri, Lincoln armed 10,000 civil-
ians and used them to disperse gatherings of southern sympathizers.' 2
The legislature of Missouri, which was pro-Union, met under the protec-
tion of the military, while the governor was effectively discouraged from
continuing with the duties of his office. 13 President Lincoln's successful
flouting of the Constitution, while no doubt necessary to save the Union,
established a dangerous precedent.' 4
5 For a detailed discussion of President Lincoln's actions during the imposed state of
emergency, see JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 2001); STEPHEN B. OATES, WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE: THE LIFE
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (1977); BRUCE CATrON, THIS HALLOWED GROUND: THE STORY OF THE
UNION SIDE OF THE CIVIL WAR (1956).
6 Intrusion into protected civil rights in the name of national security has been a fact as
long as the United States has existed under the Constitution. Perhaps the most infamous of
these early incidents were the Alien and Sedition Acts under President John Adams and the
Federalists, who used the threat of outside interference in American politics as a pretext for
silencing Thomas Jefferson and the emerging Democratic-Republican Party. For a discussion,
see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 129-30 (Richard B. Morris ed., rev. 1965).
7 These states were Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri. and Tennessee. CATrON, supra note
5, at 27-41.
8 MCPHERSON, supra note 5, at 166-67.
9 See Debora K. Kristensen, Finding the Right Balance: American Civil Liberties in
Time of War, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 2001, at 20; CATIION, supra note 5, at 28.
10 147 CONG. REC. SI 1,020 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold), avail-
able at www.senate.gov/-feingold/releases/01/10/102501at.html.
SI1 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNIrED STATES HISTORY 90-91 (1922).
See CATON, supra note 5, at 28; Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No.
9,487).
12 See CATI-ON, supra note 5, at 31-35.
13 Id.
14 President Lincoln's violations of civil liberties were not the first in American history.
The Alien and Sedition Acts, Andrew Jackson's unlawful detention of reporter Louis Louail-
ler, and military actions during "Dorr's Rebellion" in 1842 all violated personal civil liberties
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President Lincoln's assumption of wartime powers and temporary
termination of certain individual constitutional rights was effectively
evaluated only by the executive branch. I' Lincoln's actions demonstrate
a belief that only the president could appropriately balance the rights of
the individual with the nation's will to survive the threat to its liberty.
Lincoln believed that the proper constitutional test was whether the presi-
dent should "risk[] losing the Union that gave life to the Constitution
because that charter denied him the necessary authority to preserve the
Union." 16 This administrative test of power would become the model for
future generations of American presidents during times of domestic
crisis. ' 7
B. INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR I18
During World War II, the United States arrested and incarcerated
110,000 people of Japanese descent. 19 The detentions started the eve-
ning of December 7, 1941, and continued for over a year.20 Initially, the
Departments of Justice and the Army favored an exclusion policy that
would keep Japanese-Americans from sensitive areas only, but three
months after Pearl Harbor, the Western Defense Command (WDC) 2 1
switched to a policy of internment.22 WDC justified its actions with the
belief that many Japanese-Americans sympathized with Japan and would
commit acts of sabotage to support a possible invasion.2 3 The fact that
two-thirds of the Japanese-American population had American citizen-
ship did not have any real effect on the decision to intern or the subse-
quent court decisions upholding that internment as constitutional. 24
Conditions in the camps got so bad that, in addition to living behind
barbed-wire fences, these citizens had to live in horse stalls.25 Further-
in the name of national security. See Kristensen, supra note 9, at 20. The Civil War, however,
provides a clear and comprehensive example of those violations and the first real attempt to
balance individual rights with national security.
15 See id. at 21.
16 Id.
17 See id.
18 See generally JACOBUS TENBROEK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1968); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases - A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945).
19 See 147 CONG. REC. SI 1,020 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
20 See TENBROEK, supra note 18, at 101.
21 WDC was the military command for the western states charged with overseeing their
defense from possible Japanese land and sea attacks. Id. at 100, 352 n.2 (citing U.S. ARMY,
THE ARMY ALMANAC 601 (1951)).
22 TENBROEK, supra note 18, at 120.
23 TENBROEK, supra note 18, at 110.
24 See TENBROEK, supra note 18, at 311.
25 See WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF
AMERICA 300-01 (1974) (describing the conditions of the internment camps).
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more, no specific threat was required; placement in the camps could be
justified by race alone.26
A succession of cases challenged the internment as a violation of
the president's war powers and as a violation of the "equal protection of
the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment," 27 culminating in Kore-
matsu v. United States.28 The Supreme Court was called upon to con-
front the very question presented in this Note: To what extent may a
democratic society violate the very rights it was founded upon in order to
ensure the survival of that society?29 First, the Court heard Hirabayishi
v. United States,30 in which the constitutionality of a curfew targeted
entirely at one ethnic group was considered permissible under the theory
that "[t]he challenged orders were defense measures for the avowed pur-
pose of safeguarding the military area in question, at a time of threatened
air raids and invasion by the Japanese forces."' 3' Then in Korematsu, the
Supreme Court, despite articulating the requirements for strict scrutiny
for the first time, held that the internment was constitutional. 32 The
Court accepted the military's findings that no means were available that
could separate those who would probably commit sabotage and other
disloyal acts from innocent civilians. 33 Furthermore, the Court noted,
"hardships are part of war."'34 In arriving at its conclusion, the Court
decided that the proper test in evaluating civil liberty violations during
times of crises was to place great deference on the president's war pow-
ers and that the Fifth Amendment must be subservient to those powers. 35
The same year that the Supreme Court decided Korematsu, it also ruled
in Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo36 that the continued detention of "concededly
loyal" Japanese-Americans was unwarranted, 37 without specifically
overruling Korematsu.38 However, the court based its decision on the
26 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-19 (1944).
27 Id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
28 Id.
29 See id. at 228-29.
30 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
31 Id. at 94-95.
32 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20 (interpreting the equal protection element of the Fifth
Amendment to require strict scrutiny of governmental actions based on racial classification).
33 Id. at 218-19.
34 Id. at 219.
35 Id. at 217-18. The dissent argued for a new test to determine the validity of a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights, based on "whether the deprivation is reasonably related to a public
danger that is so 'immediate, imminent, and impending' as not to admit of delay and not to
permit the intervention of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger." Id. at 234
(Murphy, J., dissenting). See also Micah Herzig, Note, Is Korematsu Good Law in the Face of
Terrorism? Procedural Due Process in the Security Versus Liberty Debate, 16 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 685, 687-88 (2002).
36 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
37 Id. at 302.
38 See id. at 300-02.
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fact that Congressional authorization of the detainment of Japanese-
Americans was only with regard to an initial period of evacuation and the
fact that Congress later took corrective action regarding the detainment. 39
Even while finding the detainments unconstitutional, Mitsuye Endo still
granted great deference to the military and focused its discussion of war-
time powers on deference to the president and Congress.40
C. THE COLD WAR - MCCARTHYISM 4 1
After Allied success in World War II, the United States and the
Soviet Union quickly reverted to their former antagonisms. 42 As the
United States increasingly confronted this new enemy, it found itself in-
volved in a new war, a "cold war."'43 In response, Congress conducted
the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings44 and passed
such legislation as the anticommunist oath provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947a4 and the McCarran Act of 1950.46 This legislation sought
to criminalize communism, membership in a communist organization,
and expressions of sympathy towards communist positions. 47 The Su-
preme Court then agreed to review anticommunist legislation in Dennis
v. United States.48 The Court articulated a balancing test that "[i]n each
case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger."'49 In order to evaluate the potential invasion of free
speech, the court adopted the "clear and present danger" test first articu-
lated in Schenk v. United States50 and held that mere membership in the
Communist Party was sufficient to justify government action.51 Signifi-
cantly, Dennis recognized the elimination of a continuing peril, in this
case the overall threat of communist expansion, as a legitimate national
security goal. 52 The "clear and present danger" test, while still maintain-
39 See id.
40 See id. at 294-305. Some authors contend that Korematsu still applies in the post-
September 11, 2001, era. See, e.g., Herzig, supra note 35, at 690.
41 For a discussion of anticommunist activities within the United States from 1900 to
1950, see William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 375 (2002).
42 Id. at 406-23.
43 See id.
44 Id. at 398-99.
45 Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
46 Internal Security (McCarran) Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).
47 See Wiecek, supra note 41, at 423-28.
48 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
49 Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
50 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
51 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510-11.
52 Id. See also Steven A. Osher, Privacy, Computers, and the PATRIOT Act: The Fourth
Amendment Isn't Dead, But No One Will Insure It, 54 FLA. L. REV. 521 (2002).
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ing deference to the war powers of the president, was the first real at-
tempt at balancing the interests of national security and personal liberty.
However, this new test could not prevent the continued violation of the
constitutional rights of many American communists during the Cold
War.53
D. FISA (1978)
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 197854 provided the
next major infringement of civil rights in the interest of national security.
FISA was designed to enhance U.S. intelligence capabilities overseas
during the Cold War and, as a protection, restrict those activities within
the United States. 55 FISA's civil rights concerns focused on foreign na-
tionals within U.S. territory and specifically required that a FISA warrant
be used to obtain "foreign intelligence information." 56 However, the FBI
and CIA recently revealed that they had used these measures to conduct
electronic surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr., and other members of
the civil rights movement. 57
FISA powers were granted to the executive branch on the theory
that the FBI was not investigating crimes at all 58 but was investigating
activities of foreign intelligence agencies and, thus, the lower threshold5 9
for obtaining wiretap warrants was acceptable. 60 Under this theory,
FISA expanded the definitions of intercept orders, pen-traps, 6 1 search
warrants, and subpoenas. 62 FISA did so by authorizing the Attorney
General to conduct intercept orders for up to a year before informing the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,63 discussed infra, and did not
obligate any reporting of the orders if the intercepts were completed
within the one year framework. 64
53 See Wiecek, supra note 41, at 429-34.
54 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000)).
55 See 50 U.S.C. § 1802; Osher, supra note 52, at 532; ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDA-
TION, EFF ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT, at http://www.eff.org/
Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorismmilitias/20011031 eff usapatriot-analysis.html (Oct. 31,
2001) [hereinafter EFF ANALYSIS]. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a non-profit
group whose purpose is to advocate for the protection of individual digital privacy protections.
More information on the EFF is available at http://www.eff.org.
56 S. REP. No. 95-604, at 1; see id. at 1-19 (1978).
57 See EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at Executive Summary 3(b).
58 See 147 CoNo. REC. S 11,020 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
59 The threshold established is lower than probable cause. Id.
60 See id.
61 Pen-trap devices intercept in real time all numbers dialed from a telephone. See EFF
ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at I.A.
62 See id.
63 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 283 (2001).
64 See EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at I.A.
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FISA imposed several limits upon the government. First, both FISA
and Executive Order 12,33365 permitted surveillance against an Ameri-
can citizen within U.S. borders to be undertaken only after the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court66 issued a written order.67 Additionally,
the surveillance could not be undertaken if the information sought could
have been obtained by less intrusive means. 68 The court was supposed to
hold warrant applications to a standard of probable cause and only apply
the warrants to those considered agents of a foreign power. 69 However,
Executive Order 12,333 § 2.3 allowed for information to be collected
and disseminated if the information was needed to "protect the safety of
any persons or organizations, including those who are targets, victims or
hostages of international terrorist organizations. ' '70 Any information ob-
tained about U.S. citizens who were not targets of an investigation could
not be retained or disseminated by those intelligence agencies. 71 The
procedures for collection, retention, and dissemination of civilian infor-
mation by intelligence agencies are further codified by the classified reg-
ulations issued by those agencies. 72 Despite these precautions, between
1996 and 2000, all 4,275 FISA warrants applied for were granted.73
E. BASIC ELEMENTS OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES
In the U.S. legal system, four basic methods of electronic surveil-
lance exist. 74 These methods are (1) warrants authorizing the intercep-
tion of communications, (2) search warrants authorizing the search of
physical premises, (3) trap-and-trace devices 75 and pen traps, 76 and (4)
subpoenas requiring the production of tangible records, such as printed e-
65 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
66 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1994).
67 See Exec. Order No. 12,333; NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY IN CONDUCTING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, at http://www.fas.org/irp/
nsa/standards.html (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter NSA LEGAL STANDARDS].
68 See NSA LEGAL STANDARDS, supra note 67.
69 See id.
70 Exec. Order No. 12,333.
71 See NSA LEGAL STANDARDS, supra note 67.
72 See id. at app. A (CIA Headquarters Regulation 7-1, Law and Policy Governing the
Conduct of Intelligence Activities) (accompanying classified report only); app. B (Department
of Defense Directive 5240.1-R, DoD Activities that May Affect U.S. Persons), available at
http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm) (last visited Mar. 9, 2003); app. C (U.S. Signals Intelli-
gence Directive 18), available at http://cryptome.org/nsa-ussidl8.htm) (last visited Mar. 9,
2003).
73 See Susan Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the U.S. Department of Justice: Los-
ing Our Balances?, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew40.htm (Dec. 3, 2001).
74 See EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at I.A.
75 In a conventional telephone, trap and trace devices can identify the number and rout-
ing information of an incoming telephone call. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (2002).
76 See supra note 61.
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mails or telephone logs. 77 When the surveillance is conducted for do-
mestic reasons, these categories require a sliding scale of proof in order
to be activated. 78 Interception orders and search warrants must meet the
Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard. 79 Court orders for certain
documents, such as ISP 80 e-mail logs, require a lower standard. The
government merely has to show reasonable grounds for believing that the
information being sought is relevant and material. 81 Pen-trap surveil-
lance uses an even lower standard in requiring only a sworn government
declaration as to the relevance of the information being sought. 82 Each
of these standards applies only when the surveillance conducted is of a
domestic nature. 83
Domestic surveillance within the United States and abroad is carried
out by a variety of federal agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) is the primary federal agency responsible for domestic activities, 84
with the National Security Agency (NSA)85 and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) 86 forbidden by U.S. law from monitoring domestic activi-
ties and able only to operate outside the United States.87 All three agen-
cies are responsible for overseas surveillance, assisted by the
Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice. 88
F. THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM - THE 1996 ANTITERRORISM ACT
The 1996 Antiterrorism Act (AEDPA) 89 arose out of a February
1995 White House proposal to combat what was perceived as a growing
threat from international terrorist groups. 90 The act included the estab-
lishment of a special court that could use secret evidence to deport non-
citizens accused of association with terrorist groups, 91 empowered the
77 See EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at I.A.
78 See id.
79 See id; U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
80 ISP stands for Internet Service Provider, which facilitates the link between an Internet
user and access to the data paths of the Internet. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2002).
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 For a discussion of the standards for foreign surveillance, see discussion supra Part
I.D.
84 Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 1.14, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401.
85 Id. § 1.12(b).
86 Id. § 2.4.
87 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1) (2000) ("[Tihe Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law
enforcement powers or internal security functions.").
88 See generally Exec. Order No. 12,333 (providing for the effective division of respon-
sibilities in intelligence gathering and the protection of civil rights).
89 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996).
90 See JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM & THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFIC-
ING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1999).
91 See AEDPA § 401.
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executive branch to criminalize fundraising for groups designated as ter-
rorists,92 re-enforced the McCarran Act, 93 created the new federal crime
of terrorism, 94 created further exceptions to posse comitatus law, 95 ex-
panded the use of pre-trial detention,96 and loosened the rules governing
federal wiretaps. 97 The AEDPA was enacted as a delayed response to
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and in Oklahoma
City in 1995.98
The AEDPA contained provisions that strike at the very heart of
civil rights, in its finding of guilt by association. Civil rights groups
complained about four central provisions of the act: (1) the definition of
terrorism, (2) the criminalization of support for certain groups, (3) the
ideological exclusions in immigration law, and (4) the alien terrorist re-
moval procedures. 99 Under the act, the designation of a terrorist organi-
zation was made by the Secretary of State100 and was defined as "any...
organization 'engage[d] in terrorist activity' that threatens the 'security
of the United States."' 101 The definition of national security included
economic interests of the United States, and the definition of terrorism
included almost any act of force. 10 2 The consequences of being so desig-
nated by the Secretary of State made all members of that group ineligible
for visas10 3 and criminalized the donation of money or other resources to
such a group. 10 4 Civil liberties groups objected to these designations be-
cause some groups so designated also conducted substantial humanita-
rian activities. 10 5 The primary objection to this clause did not revolve
around the restrictions on donations (which can be justified in order to
prevent resources from landing in the hands of terrorists) but the wide
range of investigative powers granted to the FBI in the name of enforcing
92 See id. § 303.
93 See Internal Security (McCarran) Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987
(1950).
94 This provision was later dropped before the bill was made law. DEMPSEY & COLE,
supra note 90, at 106, 196 n.2.
95 The law governs the use of military force in police functions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385
(2002); Roger Blake Hohnsbeen, Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions on
Military Involvement in Civil Law Enforcement, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 404 (1986).
96 This provision was also later dropped. DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 90, at 106, 196
n.2.
97 This provision was authorized in the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year
1999. Pub. L. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2396, 2413 § 604 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l1)(b)); see
DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 90, at 142-43.
98 See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 90, at 105-16.
99 Id. at 117-26.
100 See AEDPA § 302, 110 Stat. at 1248-50.
101 Id.
102 Id. § 302.
103 Id. § 411.
104 See id. § 303.
1o5 See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 90, at 121-22.
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these measures.106 Even more fervent objections arose to the renewed
use of ideological exclusions in the immigration process. 10 7 Under this
reborn policy, guilt by association with any group or advocacy of any
idea deemed contrary to national security interests met the standard.108
Previous law had forbidden only people who were reasonably believed to
have engaged in terrorist or criminal activity. 109 Further provisions that
drew objections included the alien removal procedures, which allowed
for the use of secret evidence that did not have to be disclosed in a public
court.' 10 The AEDPA effectively lowered FISA's previous constitu-
tional protections and was specifically tailored to create legislatively en-
acted standards of review in place of constitutional tests. This continued
the switch from reliance on presidential authority to reliance on legisla-
tive mandates during times of crisis in civil liberties.
G. THE USA PATRIOT ACT
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked American Airlines
flights 11 and 77 and United Airlines flights 93 and 175 and, in a horri-
ble act of terrorism, crashed them into the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon and brought another plane down in Pennsylvania. I"' President
George W. Bush and members of Congress quickly called for new legis-
lation to ensure that such a disaster could never happen again, and law
enforcement was given the tools necessary to combat terrorists. 112 The
resulting legislation, the USA PATRIOT Act, 113 was intended to close
the loopholes in American security that allowed the terrorists to remain
undetected while conducting their operation. 114 The bill was passed on
October 26, 2001, and signed into law by President Bush. 1 5
II. CIVIL LIBERTY CONCERNS WITHIN THE USA PATRIOT
ACT AS ENACTED
Within the USA PATRIOT Act, concerns over possible electronic
civil rights intrusions can be classified into four basic categories: (1) in-
tercepting Web activities, (2) expanding Internet Service Provider privi-
leges, (3) using the Fourth Amendment's "sneak and peek" provisions in
106 Id.
107 Id. at 123-26.
108 Id.
109 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
110 DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 90, at 126. See AEDPA §§ 401-43.
'It See Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 934 (2002).
112 See id. at 934, 963-68.
113 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
114 See EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at II; Evans, supra note 111, at 967-70.
115 Evans, supra note 11, at 967.
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new ways,' 16 and (4) lowering wiretap standards. Recognizing the inher-
ent danger of the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress placed limiting sunset
provisions upon its most worrisome elements. 117 The USA PATRIOT
Act, like the legislation previously discussed, jeopardizes personal rights
by replacing constitutional tests with legislative directives. In the elec-
tronic arena, the four areas examined here provide the clearest example
of this effect.
A. INTERCEPTING WEB ACTIVITY - PEN REGISTERS AND "TRAP AND
TRACE"
Pen registers and "trap and trace" devices present a unique problem
to civil liberties law. A pen register is defined by the USA PATRIOT
Act as "a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or fa-
cility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted."
'
" 
8
Originally, pen registry law was written only for telephones and gov-
erned the real-time interception of all numbers dialed from a particular
telephone."l 9 As such, the law then referred only to numbers dialed, tele-
phone lines, and originating numbers. Before the USA PATRIOT Act,
the use of a device to monitor the transmission of those phone numbers
required a court order, but the court was granted no discretion because it
was required to approve all applications for such an order that the gov-
ernment certified were likely to obtain information relevant to a current
criminal investigation. 120
A "trap and trace" device has been defined as "a device or process
which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify
the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signal-
ing information relevant to identifying the source of a wire or electronic
communication."' 12 "Trap and trace" devices can be used to determine
the number of origin for a telephone call.'
22
116 "Sneak and peeks" are searches conducted under a proper warrant but in which the
usual notification of the owner of the property is delayed for a period of days. See id. at 973 &
nn.262-68.
117 See 147 Cong. Rec. S10990, S10991 (daily ed. Oct 25, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
118 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2001). See also ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER,
ANALYSIS OF PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, at www.epic.org/
privacy/terrorism/ata.analysis.html (Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter EPIC ANALYSIS]. Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) is a public-interest research center focusing on emerging
civil liberty issues, the First Amendment, and privacy concerns. More information on EPIC is
available at http://www.epic.org.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (1994).
122 Id.
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The effect of pen registers on personal rights is that pen registers
can capture a great deal more information then merely a telephone num-
ber. 1 23 Not requiring probable cause for these devices rested on judicial
reasoning that neither the "trap and trace" nor the pen register devices
could, prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, capture the substantive material
of the communication in question.124 The USA PATRIOT Act's expan-
sion of and consolidation of the definitions of pen registers and "trap and
trace" devices endanger the original distinction upon which the lower
level of scrutiny was justified. The expanded definition would now seem
to cover Web surfing, e-mail messages, electronic fax distributions, and
any other electronic form of communication.' 2 5 The FBI justifies these
definitional expansions by interpreting Web traffic as substantially simi-
lar to telephone conversations. 26 Despite the substantial differences, in-
cluding the vast amount of information available from an e-mail routing
protocol that cannot be gleaned from listening to a phone conversation,
this issue has never been litigated and remains unresolved.
B. EXPANDED ISP PRIVILEGE GRANTING
The USA PATRIOT Act expands existing laws concerning Internet
Service Providers in three key areas. First, the act allows ISPs to volun-
tarily surrender large amounts of non-content related data to the govern-
ment without user permission. 127 Second, a simple subpoena is now all
that is necessary to acquire IP addresses,12 8 duration and session times,
and payment sources.' 29 Third, the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes the
government to intercept any communication from a "computer tres-
passer" if the owner or operator of the protected computer in question
authorizes it to do so. 130 The key definition at stake is what constitutes a
protected computer, and it has been broadly defined in the bill to include
one "which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or
communication." 13 1
In addition to allowing broad discretion and authorization for both
the ISPs and computer owner and operators, the USA PATRIOT Act
123 See EPIC ANALYSIS, supra note 118.
124 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
125 See EPIC ANALYSIS, supra note 118.
126 See id.
127 EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at Executive Summary I.c.
128 IP addresses are temporarily assigned addresses that identify the computer user. They
are assigned by the ISP provider. Karl Maersch, ICANN'T Use My Domain Name? The Real
World Applications of ICANN's Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 34 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 1027, 1031-34.
129 EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at Executive Summary I.c.
130 EPIC ANALYSIS, supra note 118.
131 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2000).
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removes most judicial oversight of this particular task.132 In situations
that do not result in prosecution, the computer users whose activities are
targeted are likely never to discover the monitoring, and therefore they
would be effectively unable to challenge the provision in court. 133 Fur-
thermore, law enforcement could unduly pressure owners and operators
of computers to obtain permission for the interception and to circumvent
the safeguards built into the PATRIOT Act. 134
C. SNEAK AND PEEK SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The USA PATRIOT Act expands delayed notice of search and
seizure by increasing the number of possible exceptions under which au-
thorities may secretly search premises for physical evidence without no-
tifying the owner. 135 Rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires officers to leave a receipt for all items seized in a
search. 136 However, the FISA and wiretap provisions under Title 18
both allow for delayed notice of intelligence operations and communica-
tion interception. 37 The Second Circuit in U.S. v. Villegas allowed cov-
ert searches in which no physical evidence was removed, but the court
cautioned that certain procedural safeguards were needed in order to pre-
vent the abuse of such powers.' 38 The court suggested that one such
safeguard could be a showing of reasonable necessity for the delayed
notice. 139 Contrary to the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit held that a
delayed notice could not extend beyond a seven-day period except upon
a strong showing of necessity.' 40 However, the court did allow for a
good-faith exception.' 41 The USA PATRIOT Act expands the use of
these "sneak and peek" seizures. 142
132 See EPIC ANALYSIS, supra note 118.
133 See id.
134 See Peter Murphy, An Examination of the United States Department of Justice's At-
tempt to Conduct Warrantless Monitoring of Computer Networks Through the Consent Excep-
tion to the Wiretap Act, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1317, 1321-30 (2002); Sharon H. Rackow, How the
USA PATRIOT Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement upon the Privacy of Americans in
the Name of "Intelligence" Investigations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1674-80 (2002).
135 See Marcia Coyle, New Search Law Likely to Provoke Fourth Amendment Challenge,
SIERRA TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001 at http://www.sierratimes.com/archive/files/oct/30/
armc 103001 .htm.
136 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d).
137 See Coyle, supra note 135.
138 United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1990).
139 Id.
140 United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
141 Id. at 1456-57.
142 18 U.S.C. § 3103(a) (2002).
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D. LOWER WIRETAP STANDARDS
Wiretaps have traditionally been reserved for very specific crimes,
and wiretap law has historically lagged behind the advent of new techno-
logical means of communication. More properly titled "law enforcement
intercept orders,"' 143 the USA PATRIOT Act adds terrorism and com-
puter abuses as defined in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) ' to the list of acceptable intercepts. 145 While few would see a
problem in adding terrorism to this list or in expanding intercepts to
cover voice mail, the CFAA presents a more complicated danger in that
the law may be broken by merely violating security classifications' 46 or
by violating the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.147
Traditionally, Title III of the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968148 governs electronic surveillance in criminal investigations. 149
With the exception of minimal emergency situations, Title III imposes
the normal probable cause requirement upon law enforcement, requires a
warrant in most situations, and enforces the doctrine through judicial
oversight and the inadmissibility of the evidence in court. 150 Under Title
III, broad investigative power, including the use of roving wiretaps, 151
can be granted once the probable cause element is satisfied. 152 Further-
more, the standard for intercepting the numbers called from a particular
phone is the substantially lesser standard of merely having the govern-
ment certify that the information is "relevant to an ongoing
investigation." 153
Initially, the USA PATRIOT Act contained provisions that lowered
wiretap standards even further. The Bush administration's proposal in-
cluded an allowance for the use of wiretap information obtained by for-
143 This terminology is used because many intercepted communications no longer travel
over wires. Changes in means of communication have created an overlap between the wiretap
category and seizure of other means of communication. Cindy Cohn, EFF Analysis of the
Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act - That Relate to Online Activities, 701 PLI/PAT 1201
(2002).
144 USA PATRIOT Act § 1030.
145 See EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at II.A.
146 USA PATRIOT Act § 1030(a)(l). This is one possible interpretation of the term "pro-
tected computer" and the author's evaluation of the statute. The concern is that someone who
knowingly accesses a computer that she does not have a high enough security clearance for,
even though she has a lower security clearance, could be liable under this statute.
147 Pub. L. No. 83-703, 60 Stat. 755 (1954). See also EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55.
148 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (1994).
149 Herman, supra note 73; Rackow, supra note 134, at 1657-58.
15o Herman, supra note 73; see Rackow, supra note 134, at 1659.
15 1 Roving wiretaps have the constitutional problem of failing to satisfy the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment for the place to be searched. See Herman, supra note
73.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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eign governments in a manner that would previously have been deemed
illegal when used against U.S. citizens in trials inside the United
States.' 54 However, this proposal was later dropped at the insistence of
members of Congress who were worried about the act's
constitutionality. 1 55
E. EFFECT OF SUNSET PROVISIONS - ARE THEY ADEQUATE
SAFEGUARDS?
The USA PATRIOT Act provides a similar solution to many of the
civil rights concerns that previous incursions into these rights had relied
on. The act provides that a number of the more suspect or dangerous
provisions will expire after a standard period of no less than four
years. 15 6 Included in these provisions are the wiretap authorities,1 57 pen
registry interception, 58 foreign intelligence information, 159 and roving
surveillance. 160 Most notably, not included in the act's sunset provisions
are the immunity for compliance with FISA wiretap provisions, 16 the
authorization to sneak and peek, 162 the overriding of certain privacy pro-
visions in the Cable Act, 163 single jurisdiction search warrants in cases of
terrorism, 64 and the expansion of the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act' 65 to include e-mail routing information. 166 None of the mea-
sures adopted requires a reporting requirement either to Congress or the
courts, making congressional determinations of renewal problematic at
best. 167
Sunset provisions allow for the termination of suspect laws but do
nothing to solve the violations that occur while those laws run their
course. Should one of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act be inter-
preted in a manner that seriously violates personal privacy rights, a sun-
set provision would provide little comfort to those whom the provision
154 See 147 CONG. REC. S 11,020 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold),
available at www.senate.gov/-feingold/releases/01/10/102501at.html.
155 Id. at S 11,021.
156 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2002); EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at IV.
157 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002).
158 USA PATRIOT Act § 214, 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (West Supp. 2002).
159 Id. § 218, 50 U.S.C. § 1822 (West Supp. 2002).
160 USA PATRIOT Act § 206, 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (West 1991 & Supp. 2002).
161 Id. § 225.
162 USA PATRIOT Act § 213, 18 U.S.C. § 3103a (West 2000 & Supp. 2002).
163 USA PATRIOT Act § 211, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002).
164 USA PATRIOT Act § 219, FED R. CRIM. P. 41(a) (West 1976 & Supp. 2002).
165 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986); 18 U.S.C. § 5210 (West 2000 & Supp.
2002).
166 USA PATRIOT Act § 210, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002).
167 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, USAPA Sunset Provisions Could Leave Congress
in the Dark (Dec. 17, 2001), at http://www.eff.org/sc/20011212_eff usapa~analysis.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2002) [hereinafter EFF Sunset Provisions].
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was used against. In order to safely use sunset provisions, the issue at
hand must be significantly close to being constitutional that the amount
of damage done to a person or group of people is minimal in comparison
to the national security gained. This is not to say that a great deal of
damage done to a small number of persons or groups would be accept-
able if it served the greater societal good but, rather, that the damage to
each individual would be of small enough magnitude that the intrusion
into whichever right is in question would not result in significant harm.
III. THE FUTURE BALANCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN A
TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT
A. WHY Is A NEW STANDARD NECESSARY?
A new constitutional test is necessary because previous tests and
standards have failed to adequately protect individual rights during crises
in national security, the USA PATRIOT Act and the electronic age pre-
sent increased challenges and previously unseen circumstances, and ex-
isting constitutional tests cannot properly meet these new challenges and
circumstances.
The historical examples provided in Section I are but a small sam-
pling of the numerous and repeated infractions of civil rights in times of
national security.'168 These examples reveal an ever-changing and inade-
quate standard that failed to stop some of the more shameful incidents in
the history of the United States. Neither President Lincoln's balancing,
McCarthyism, nor the Supreme Court's justification for the internment of
Japanese-Americans effectively protected individual or even group
liberties.
FISA and the anti-terrorism legislation of the 1990s reveal more
recent attempts by Congress and various presidential administrations to
curb not only the civil liberties of certain individuals and groups but also
the ability of the courts to review and redress constitutional violations
that might have already occurred. The obvious historical failure to pro-
tect individual rights, along with the dubious value to national security of
some of these actions, 169 reveal a need for a new constitutional test that
will better protect individual rights in times of crisis.
The USA PATRIOT Act - and the information age it was enacted
in - present new challenges that courts, applying the current legal tests,
are ill-prepared to handle. Our electronic age presents a dizzying array
of new technology and new methods of carrying out surveillance,
searches, and seizures, with little direction about how to constitutionally
168 For additional examples, see Kristensen, supra note 9, at 20-21.
169 See supra Part I.C.
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evaluate these new methods. 170 FISA, the AEDPA, and the USA PA-
TRIOT Act recognize this problem and attempt to use legislation to de-
fine constitutionality, including standards of scrutiny, without explicitly
doing So. 1 7 1 While congressional mandate may seem the logical way to
accomplish a task the courts seem unable to handle, this legislation hin-
ders the basic watchdog function of the courts.172 The judicial branch
cannot abandon its oversight duties in the midst of ever-changing tech-
nology and threats to national security but must develop constitutional
tests that can effectively balance the competing interests of national se-
curity and individual rights.
Such is the case because current legal regimes are not enough, by
themselves, to effectively balance the interests in question. This country
has a duty to protect its citizens from external threats and to protect indi-
vidual liberties guaranteed in the Constitution and its Bill of Rights. In
recognition of the fact that these duties have come into conflict repeat-
edly throughout the history of the United States, there are three options.
One, the United States could abandon all constitutional guarantees during
wartime and only follow the dictates of national security. Given the im-
plausibility of this option, alternatively the United States could enforce
all constitutional rights regardless of the peril to the country. This ap-
proach would allow for the continued application of all current constitu-
tional tests and a relatively straightforward legal analysis. However, the
historical situations previously mentioned show that there are at least
some circumstances in which the interests of national security and the
interest in protecting all individual liberties conflict. 173 Applying current
constitutional tests, regardless of the peril to the country, would deny the
government the tools necessary to defend the country in the moments of
greatest need. 174 Given these conflicting interests, the best solution
would be a new balancing test that could adequately protect individual
rights while still allowing the government certain leeway in times of
crisis.
170 See, e.g., Jeffrey Yeates, CALEA and RIPA: The U.S. and the U.K. Responses to Wire-
tapping in an Increasingly Wireless World, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 125, 126-27 (2001).
171 See discussion supra Parts I.D., I.F., I.G.
172 For example, FISA created a special court outside of the normal chain of review.
While this may seem to be an attempt to preserve constitutional rights, the court has considera-
ble power, little constitutional oversight, and an extremely low standard of review. See supra
notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
173 See discussion supra Part I.A. There seems, for example, to be little dispute about the
effectiveness of President Lincoln's actions in preserving the United States. See Kristensen,
supra note 9, at 21.
174 See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(declaring that the Constitution is not a "suicide pact").
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B. EFF's AND EPIC's PROPOSED NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
As Justice Burger once stated for the Court, "It is 'obvious and
unarguable' that no government interest is more compelling than the se-
curity of the Nation."' 175 Given that national security and civil rights will
frequently be in conflict, the Electronic Freedom Foundation (EFF) and
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) have developed criteria for
evaluating national security legislation. While these criteria are not legal
standards, they are useful in evaluating the effectiveness of the legal
standards meant to protect individual rights.
EFF advocates consideration of six factors when evaluating the civil
rights implications of electronic media security legislation. 76 Those ele-
ments are as follows: (1) carefully limiting all investigations into bona
fide terrorist groups to means with appropriate oversight, (2) granting the
courts the power to punish any abusers of these new laws, including gov-
ernmental organizations, (3) enabling courts to exclude evidence ob-
tained in contravention of the safeguards built into national security
legislation, (4) defining vague terms in the legislation in favor of civil
liberties, (5) requiring certification by the attorney general that a wiretap
applies to ISPs and others served with roving wiretaps, and (6) creating
congressional accountability for all organizations, so that the sunset pro-
visions may be properly evaluated. 77 While not the entire EFF wish list
for national security legislation, this list shows a clear attempt to recog-
nize the USA PATRIOT Act (and future legislation of a similar nature)
as temporary and required only so long as the problem exists.
EPIC takes a different approach to arrive at similar conclusions.178
EPIC's five-point plan for the USA PATRIOT Act involves the follow-
ing: (1) advocating that law enforcement already possesses broad author-
ity under the AEDPA, (2) instituting a requirement of "clear and
convincing need" for each provision, (3) narrowly tailoring national se-
curity statutes to avoid infringing upon the rights of millions of legal
users of the Internet and other electronic media, (4) preserving to the
greatest extent possible the distinction between domestic criminal sur-
veillance and foreign intelligence gathering, and (5) limiting the ex-
panded investigative powers to terrorist activities by not allowing those
powers to be used in common criminal investigations or in cases where
the nature of the activity is unknown.' 79 EPIC's standards revolve
around the conviction that the government should be required to show a
clear need for any violations of civil rights and to ensure as little intru-
175 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
176 See EFF ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at Executive Summary, Future Actions.
177 See id.
178 See EPIC ANALYSIS, supra note 118.
179 See id.
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sion as necessary into the lives of U.S. citizens by separating the various
apparati that conduct foreign and domestic surveillance work. 180 In re-
quiring this separation, EPIC hopes that institutional specializations, mis-
sion orientations, and internal cultures will develop along different lines
for the agencies tasked with surveillance. 81
C. THE PROPOSED TEST - "ONE STEP LOWER"
In light of the factors proposed by EFF and EPIC and of the in-
fringements in civil liberties noted above, the appropriate test to apply to
future legislation during times of national security crisis is the "one step
lower" test. The "one step lower" test consists of three parts. First, the
court must apply an intermediate scrutiny-like analysis of the legislation
in question. Then the court must determine the appropriate standard of
review absent any crisis in national security. Finally, the court must ap-
ply the next lowest test, in order from most restrictive to least restrictive
upon government action, than the test that would normally be applied
absent a national security crisis. For example, if during a time of im-
pending attack by another country, the United States passed a law that
would normally be considered content-based, the courts would, after
deeming national security an important governmental interest, apply the
intermediate test articulated above. If the overall legislation passed that
test, and the court determined that the legislation in question would under
normal circumstances be reviewed using a strict scrutiny standard, the
court would then apply the "one step lower" test and apply the next
lower level of review, in this case, intermediate scrutiny.
In order to apply this test, the originating piece of legislation first
must undergo analysis similar to the intermediate scrutiny articulated by
the Supreme Court for First Amendment questions. If legislation were
challenged, courts would have to decide whether to apply the "one step
lower" test or the more traditional constitutional analysis. The most ob-
vious identifying marker of proper evaluation would be whether the gov-
ernment raises national security as a justification for the constitutionality
of the bill when it is challenged. Once the government raises national
security as a justification, the law must undergo an intermediate analysis
to determine whether the law in question is substantially related to an
important government interest. As every court will no doubt recognize
national security as an important governmental purpose, the court's eval-
uation will center on whether the specific action taken is substantially
related to the government's interest in protecting the country. Addition-
ally, the narrowly tailored requirements of intermediate scrutiny will en-
180 See id.
181 See id.
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sure at least some procedural limitations on the scope of any national
security legislation.
Once the decision to apply the "one step lower" test is made, the
legislation would then be analyzed and classified under either the First
Amendment or the Fourth Amendment. The primary concern of this
Note, and arguably the USA PATRIOT Act as well, is with Fourth
Amendment search and seizure principles. However, the "one step
lower" test can be applied to either the First or Fourth Amendments. As
such, an order of magnitude must be established for the different tests
applied by the Supreme Court. Under First Amendment analysis, the
order follows logical succession. A court that would normally apply
strict scrutiny would now apply intermediate scrutiny. Likewise, if the
court decided to use the "one step lower" test, a rational basis test would
be used when normally intermediate scrutiny would apply. The Fourth
Amendment presents more of a challenge in determining the order of the
tests, but once an agreed-upon order is established, the tests would be
easy to apply. Under the Fourth Amendment, the order of tests, ranging
from most restrictive to least restrictive might be: warrant based on prob-
able cause always required; 182 probable cause plus exigent circumstances
without a warrant;18 3 probable cause only, with no warrant necessary;1
84
Terry-level stops for a limited duration with the corresponding reasona-
ble suspicion standard; 185 and "special government need" searches along
the lines of current "administrative-code inspections"' 186 and border
searches. 187 It is important to note that special government-need
searches, with their limited standard of review, cannot be used then as a
justification to apply the lowest possible standard and thus circumvent
this test.
The rankings of the different tests are this author's own and are
meant to illustrate how the proposed test could work. However, the "one
182 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967) (holding that a search that impli-
cates a person's constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy generally requires
a warrant based upon probable cause).
183 See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (holding that warrantless entry of a
home, outside of hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, is permissible if police have probable cause
to believe evidence will be destroyed, the suspect will escape, or harm will come to police or
other individuals).
184 See id. at 100-01.
185 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (holding that a reasonable suspicion gov-
erned a short, minimal search on the street that lasted for only a few minutes and only briefly
seized the suspects).
186 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) (holding that in admin-
istrative searches, such as one conducted by a housing inspector, probable cause means "rea-
sonable suspicion").
187 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (holding that a person may be
stopped without any individualized suspicion and searched at an international border or an
equivalent entry point to the United States).
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step lower" test could apply the rankings of the test in any order that a
later court would decide. The only element necessary is that a court,
preferably the Supreme Court, would establish a ranking of the tests in-
volved so as to simplify and standardize lower courts' application of
them.
Any legislation that had the "one step lower" test applied to it would
be required to have constitutional safeguards built in. This safeguard
would be a sunset provision for all the measures to which the test would
be applied. The sunset provision would provide that any measure contro-
versial and constitutionally questionable enough to have to avail itself of
the "one step lower" test would expire at the termination of hostilities or
after a period of two years, whichever is lesser. This termination period
is necessary due both to the indeterminate nature of modem warfare and
the continual threat of terrorism. Sunset provisions ensure that measures
that are constitutionally questionable but justified in the name of immedi-
ate necessity do not become permanent law and that they instead expire
at the end of the crises to the security of the nation. Furthermore, the
two-year standard requires that ongoing crises and terrorist threats cannot
be used to grant a carte blanche for lowered standards of review for ex-
tended periods of time.
The proper remedial sanction for Fourth Amendment violations
would follow the traditional exclusionary rule188 and "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" 189 doctrines. Evidence obtained in violation of the standards of
the "one step lower" test would be excluded from use in court, and any
evidence derived from it would also be excluded. This would deter po-
lice from breaking the lowered standards of review in place during a
national security crisis.
Additionally, a defendant would have available the affirmative de-
fense that the evidence used against him was obtained by the use of a
national security exception even though the defendant was not connected
in any way to an organization or situation that would pose a danger to the
country. The defendant would be required to prove by a "preponderance
of the evidence" that the investigator was or should have been aware that
the defendant was not involved in activities threatening national security.
If the investigating officer should have been aware of the lack of national
security implications, the normal higher standard of review would apply.
This provision prevents the "one step lower" test from being used as a
188 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary doc-
trine keeps evidence that was unconstitutionally obtained by police from being used at trial
against a defendant).
189 See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (holding that the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine requires that any evidence obtained as a direct result of police viola-
tion of a defendant's constitutional rights must also be inadmissible).
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tool during times of crisis in national security to investigate and prose-
cute non-terrorists. By placing the burden of proof on the defendant, the
provision would give the government the benefit of the doubt in the ap-
plication of these new laws, while still protecting against flagrant abuses
of the expanded governmental powers granted under the "one step
lower" test.
D. WHY THE "ONE STEP LOWER" TEST WOULD WORK
The "one step lower" test would work better than previous tests be-
cause it replaces an eclectic range of tests with one simple, relatively
easy to apply test yet builds upon existing constitutional law standards,
such as intermediate scrutiny and the various Fourth Amendment stan-
dards. Furthermore, the proposed test provides better protection for indi-
vidual rights during times of crisis in national security.
Despite the relatively complicated constitutional area to which the
"one step lower" test would be applied, the test remains relatively simple
to apply. As such, it replaces the myriad case law, statutes, and execu-
tive standards that have been propagated in times of war with a single
standard. It is a standard that can be applied regardless of the circum-
stances. Furthermore, the standard is broad enough to evolve with ever-
changing technologies and threats. The "one step lower" test is designed
to be both general enough and flexible enough to apply to the USA PA-
TRIOT Act, other constitutional crises during times of national security
threats, and further into the future, until such time as a better balancing
of interests can be achieved.
Additionally, the "one step lower" test is easily adaptable because it
is composed of existing tests. Parties will not need to litigate over the
meaning of the new test. All that is necessary is for the court to apply
the traditional intermediate scrutiny test to determine if the conduct in
question meets the narrowly tailored prong and reasonably relates to a
legitimate government interest. Then the court selects the next less re-
strictive test and applies that test, again with its historic development, to
the incident in question. While the problem of analogizing to previous
circumstances and events remains, the court is not required to create or
define new legal standards. The proposed test would only require the
application of already existing standards to new problems and would thus
serve the interests of judicial economy.
Finally, and most importantly, the "one step lower" test best pro-
tects individual rights during times of crisis by ensuring that minimum
standards are met even during the darkest of times. The "one step lower"
test balances individual rights against the country's right to survival by
acknowledging the national security interest and correspondingly apply-
ing a test that is lower than what would be applied in a normal situation.
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However, the real strength of the proposed test is that it only allows for a
reduction in constitutional protections by an order of one and prevents
the government from using reasons of national security as a rug under
which to sweep drastic changes. The protections built into the "one step
lower" test ensure that the actions taken are necessary for the emergency
in question, narrowly tailored to meet that objective, expire after an ap-
propriate amount of time, and still afford at least a basic minimum of
constitutional rights no matter how dire the situation. By doing so, the
"one step lower" test most effectively preserves some core constitutional
rights while allowing for latitude in governmental action during the cri-
ses that most require extreme defensive measures.
CONCLUSION
On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush declared,
"we're in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live
by them."'190 History shoNws, however, that when we are fighting for our
principles, we have frequently failed to live by them. Previous constitu-
tional tests applied during times of crisis have resulted in large-scale con-
stitutional infringements and deprivations. Moreover, the USA
PATRIOT Act and terrorism in the electronic age provide ever develop-
ing challenges in a legal setting that has difficulty keeping up. This
Note's proposed test would provide a clearer, more effective safeguard
for those principles in this new and changing world and would provide
the necessary balance between protecting individual rights and the soci-
ety that shelters them.
190 President George W. Bush, Presidential Response Concerning the Events of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. D37, cited in Lori Sachs, September 11, 2001: The Constitu-
tion During Crises: A New Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1715, 1716 (2002).
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